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A Comprehensive Consideration of the
Structural-Error Doctrine
Zachary L. Henderson*

ABSTRACT
Court proceedings are rarely perfect – far from it. Errors happen regularly
before and during litigation, and when they do, courts must decide how to handle
them. Gone are the days when a typo might demand a new trial: many errors –
typos certainly, but also much more serious mistakes – are regularly deemed
harmless by the court, meaning those errors had no prejudicial effect on the
outcome of the case (and so do not warrant a new trial). Yet even after the
development of the harmless-error doctrine in the early part of the twentieth
century, errors involving constitutional rights were de facto prejudicial: if a
defendant could identify a constitutional error then he was entitled to a new trial.
This rule, too, eventually gave way: by the late 1960s the United States Supreme
Court had ruled that most constitutional errors were susceptible to harmlesserror analysis. But there has remained a narrow set of constitutional errors that,
once identified, still automatically entitle a defendant to a new trial. These are
called “structural errors,” and are the topic of this Article.
The idea that some errors are “structural” was introduced nearly thirty
years ago, yet the criteria for what makes an error structural are even less clear
now than they were then – indeed, over the past few years the doctrine has
arguably gone through a transformation of sorts. This Article describes the
origins and development of the structural-error doctrine, lists and analyzes all
of the ostensibly “structural” errors identified by the circuit courts (the
culmination of a nine-hundred-opinion case survey), discusses and attempts to
reconcile the current state of the law, and, finally, offers guidance on several
outstanding questions – specifically, how the structural-error doctrine interfaces
with the plain-error doctrine, and whether structural errors are waivable. The
author hopes that this article will provide an up-to-date, comprehensive, and
accurate resource on structural error that will prove helpful to judges,
practitioners, and academics alike.

*

Zachary Henderson is a litigation associate at Kirkland & Ellis, LLP, a former
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I. INTRODUCTION
Courts and parties commit errors all the time, and those errors are often
the stuff appeals are made of. Perhaps a judge gave a bad evidentiary ruling,1
or a sentencing judge adopted a probation officer’s faulty Sentencing
Guidelines recommendation;2 the list of errors that could occur at various
points in a trial are limitless. In fact, litigation today is so complex that a
totally error-free case is probably the exception rather than the norm.3
For centuries, courts have wrestled with what to do about error. In recent
times, the United States Supreme Court identified a special category of
constitutional errors called structural errors.4 As the name suggests, structural
errors do not occur in a vacuum.5 They have broad effects that not only reach
forward to the outcome of a case, but backward (to the foundation of the case)
and inward (to its structure).6 In short, structural errors have the effect of
somehow “breaking” the proceedings in a fundamental, irreversible way.
While most errors are subject to the harmless-error doctrine – meaning a
reviewing court asks whether the error on review actually affected a party’s
substantial rights before reversing the case – structural errors are
automatically reversible; no harmlessness analysis is required.7
The Supreme Court has tried to be clear that the list of structural errors
is short,8 but that has not stopped litigants from trying to shoehorn the errors
in their own cases into the structural-error doctrine, nor has it stopped the
circuit courts from identifying more than a dozen new, ostensibly “structural”
errors.9

1. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (granting
certiorari to review errors in the Mississippi trial court’s evidentiary rulings).
2. See, e.g., Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016)
(reviewing a district court’s adoption and application of an incorrect Sentencing
Guidelines range).
3. In the forward to his book on harmless error, Justice Traynor once called
errors the “insects in the world of law, travelling through it in swarms, often
unnoticed in their endless procession.” Justice Robert J. Traynor, THE RIDDLE OF
HARMLESS ERROR, Ohio State University Press, 3 (1970).
4. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–310 (1991).
5. Id. at 309–10 (“The entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end is
obviously affected by the absence of counsel for a criminal defendant, just as it is
by the presence on the bench of a judge who is not impartial. . . . Each of these
constitutional deprivations . . . affect[s] the framework within which the trial
proceeds, rather than simply an error in the process itself.”).
6. Id.
7. Id. (“These are structural defects in the constitution of the trial
mechanism, which defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards.”).
8. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997) (“We have found
structural errors only in a very limited class of cases.”).
9. See infra, Section III-C.
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This Article seeks to provide a comprehensive treatment of the
structural-error doctrine, as created and maintained by the Supreme Court, and
as applied by the circuit courts. Considerable effort went into ensuring the
comprehensiveness of the treatment of the issue: this Article is the
culmination of the careful review of over nine hundred circuit and Supreme
Court opinions, all dealing in some way with the structural-error doctrine.
Part II begins by discussing the structural-error doctrine more generally,
including its origins in Subpart A and development in Subpart B, followed by
an in-depth discussion of the Supreme Court’s significant opinion in Weaver
v. Massachusetts in Subpart C and that decision’s likely future implications in
Subpart D. 10 Part III moves down an order of generality by first proposing a
prescriptive, functional definition of “structural error” in Subpart A, with the
hope that this definition can help shed light on why a given error is or is not
structural. The Article then discusses each of the nine structural errors
explicitly identified by the Supreme Court in Subpart B as well as the (many)
such errors identified by the circuit courts but not yet ratified or rejected by
the Supreme Court in Subpart C. (As it turns out, most of them are probably
not structural errors after all.) Part IV considers and attempts to resolve
several unanswered questions about the doctrine. It begins with a short
overview of the waiver and forfeiture doctrines in Subpart A before discussing
how the structural-error doctrine interfaces with the plain-error doctrine in
Subpart B and whether structural errors are waivable in Subpart C.

II. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRUCTURAL-ERROR
DOCTRINE
Since announcing the structural-error doctrine in 1991, the Supreme
Court and circuit courts have struggled to pin down a definition of structural
error that is neither over- nor under-inclusive. At the core of the structuralerror doctrine is the idea that some constitutional errors damage the
framework of the trial so thoroughly that no aspect of the trial is reliable any
longer.11 In such cases, we cannot look to the rest of the trial to decide whether
the error that occurred was harmless; if the error damaged the foundation of
the trial, then no part of that trial can be relied on to help determine whether
the error in question was harmless.12 This is all well and good in the abstract,
but applying it to specific errors in specific cases can be difficult. After all, it
is probably true that most defendants are convinced that the error they fell
victim to seriously affected the fairness of their trial.
The history, origins, and development of the doctrine offer the best
opportunity to understand the contours of what makes an error structural or
not. Accordingly, we begin at the beginning.

10. Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017).
11. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309–10.
12. Id.
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A. Origins
The term “structural error” first entered the judicial lexicon in the early
1990s. In Arizona v. Fulminante, the Supreme Court introduced the idea of
“structural defects,”13 and just a few months later in Freytag v. C.I.R., Justice
Scalia used the phrase “structural errors,”14 the term that stuck. Yet
Fulminante – a case this Article discusses at length later – does not represent
the absolute beginning of the structural-error doctrine; far from it. To
understand the origins of structural error – a kind of error not susceptible to
harmless-error review – we first must understand the origins of harmless error
itself.

1. Harmless Error
As Justice Traynor once put it, there was a time in American
jurisprudence when “no error was lightly forgiven.”15 “[T]he slightest error
in a trial could spoil the judgment,” and legal proceedings were “entirely
surrounded by booby traps.”16 In the mid-to-late 1800s, the federal and state
courts of appeals were so paralyzed by their own fear of judicial overreach17
that they had turned themselves into what one scholar described as
“impregnable citadels of technicality.”18 In The Riddle of Harmless Error,
Justice Traynor pointed to two examples of this.19 In 1863, the Supreme Court
of California reversed a judgment in a robbery case due to an error of
omission: the indictment did not specify that the taken property did not belong
to the defendant.20 In another case a decade later, the same court overturned
a criminal conviction because the indictment contained a typo: it charged the
defendant with “larcey” (rather than “larceny”).21
By the early 1900s, dissatisfaction with this approach to error was vocal
and ubiquitous.22 In 1906, Roscoe Pound, the renowned scholar and eventual
dean of Harvard Law School, declared, without hyperbole, that “the worst

13. Id.
14. See Freytag v. C.I.R., 501 U.S. 868, 896 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
15. Traynor, supra note 3, at 3.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 13.
18. Marcus A. Kavanagh, Improvement of Administration of Criminal Justice
by Exercise of Judicial Power, 59 A.B.A. J. 217, 222 (1925).
19. Traynor, supra note 3, at 3–4.
20. People v. Vice, 21 Cal. 344, 345 (1863).
21. People v. St. Clair, 56 Cal. 406, 407 (1880).
22. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 178, 185 (1937); Roger
A. Fairfax Jr., A Fair Trial, Not a Perfect One: The Early Twentieth-Century
Campaign for the Harmless Error Rule, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 433, 436–37 (2009).
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feature of American procedure is the lavish granting of new trials.”23 Justice
Rutledge would later recount, in his majority opinion in Kotteakos v. United
States, that “[s]o great was the threat of reversal, in many jurisdictions, that
criminal trial became a game for sowing reversible error in the record, only to
have repeated the same matching of wits when a new trial had been thus
obtained.”24
The dam finally broke when, in 1919, Congress amended the law
governing grants of new trials in the federal courts. The Act of February 26,
1919 clarified that, before granting a new trial,
[T]he court shall give judgment after an examination of the entire
record before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or
exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.25

This re-centering of federal error analysis around substantial rights begot
our modern harmless error doctrine26 and led to similar adoptions in the state
courts.27 Eventually, all fifty states passed harmless-error statutes or rules.28
After Kotteakos, harmless-error doctrine took root in American
jurisprudence29 – but at the same time that the Kotteakos Court applied this
doctrine, it also hinted that there still existed a whole class of errors to which
harmless-error analysis might not apply.30 Where the error in question was a
departure from “a constitutional norm or a specific command of Congress,”
the Court said, even a non-prejudicial error might still need to be reversed.31

2. Constitutional Error
For years after Kotteakos, courts continued to routinely reverse cases
without a finding of prejudice when the error implicated constitutional rights

23. Pound, supra note 22, at 185.
24. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946).
25. Act of Feb. 19, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. L. 1181, repealed by Act of June
25, 1948, ch. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 992, 998 (emphasis added).
26. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 757.
27. Edson R. Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review, 5 TEX. L. REV.
126, 147 (1927).
28. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
29. According to at least one scholar, courts were so zealous in their adoption
of the harmless-error doctrine that, after Kotteakos, “it sometimes seemed that
error was presumed to be harmless and that the burden of proof was on the
defendant to prove otherwise.” Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless
Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988, 1009 (1973).
30. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 760.
31. Id. at 764–765.
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and norms.32 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself began to state more confidently
that harmless error was “an impermissible doctrine” to apply to constitutional
errors.33 Yet courts were not consistent in applying this per se reversal rule
for constitutional cases,34 and in Chapman v. California the Court finally
announced that harmless-error analysis could be applied to constitutional
errors after all, subject to several notable exceptions.35
The Chapman Court began by explaining that some constitutional errors
remained insusceptible to harmless-error review. (The court gave three
examples:36 coerced confessions,37 the right to counsel,38 and the right to an
impartial judge.39) Nevertheless, it held that constitutional errors could be
held harmless, so long as the court is “able to declare a belief that it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”40 We will return to this language, for
Chapman’s focus on the court’s ability to be certain of harmlessness
foreshadows the Court’s reasoning in Fulminante and its establishment of the
structural-error doctrine.41
After Chapman, the Court applied harmless-error review to a broad array
of constitutional errors, including overbroad jury instructions in capital
sentencing cases,42 admissions of evidence at sentencing in capital cases,43
jury instructions containing erroneous presumptions,44 jury instructions that
misstate elements of the offense,45 the improper exclusion of a defendant’s
testimony about the circumstances of his confession,46 various Confrontation
Clause violations,47 the denial of a defendant’s right to be present at his own

32. See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 537 (1963) (holding that
harmless-error review is an “impermissible doctrine” to apply to coerced
confessions).
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Donnelly, 179 F.2d 227, 233 (7th Cir. 1950)
(reviewing for harmlessness a Fourth-Amendment search-and-seizure violation),
overruled by United States v. Burke, 781 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1985).
35. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
36. Id. at 23 n.8.
37. See Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958).
38. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
39. See Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927).
40. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 53–56.
42. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752–54 (1990).
43. Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258–60 (1988).
44. Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266 (1989); see also Rose v. Clark,
478 U.S. 570, 579–80 (1986).
45. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501–04 (1987).
46. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691 (1986).
47. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986); see also Moore v.
Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230–32
(1973).
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trial,48 improper comment on a defendant’s Fifth-Amendment right to silence
at trial,49 failing to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence,50 various
admissions of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments,51 and the denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing.52 Suffice
it to say that, after Chapman, the Court’s harmless-error application to even
constitutional errors was robust.

3. Structural Error
With harmless-error analysis suddenly applying to most constitutional
errors, it was becoming less and less clear why a small set of constitutional
errors were unsusceptible to a finding of prejudice. In Arizona v. Fulminante,
the Court finally settled on an organizing principle to explain these
exceptions.53 Justice Rehnquist, writing for a five-justice majority, explained
that constitutional errors that occur during the course of a trial are susceptible
to harmless-error review, because such errors can be “quantitatively assessed
in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its
admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”54 As for those
constitutional errors that remained per se reversible without a finding of
harmlessness55 – such as violations of one’s right to counsel, or one’s right to
be tried before an impartial judge – those errors cannot simply be “assessed
in the context of other evidence.”56 Instead, those are “structural defects” that
affect “the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by
‘harmless error’ standards.”57

B. Development
Fulminante was a controversial opinion from day one. Many scholars
empathized with the four-justice dissent, led by Justice White, that argued the
majority’s distinction of trial errors on the one hand and structural errors on
the other was based on the fiction that the Court’s jurisprudence could be
neatly classified.58 Some scholars went further, pointing out that the majority
had provided three inconsistent definitions for what constituted a trial error in

48. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117–18 (1983).
49. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510–12 (1983).
50. Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789–90 (1979) (per curiam).
51. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372, 377–78 (1972); see also
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52–53 (1970).
52. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1970).
53. Fulminante v. Arizona, 499 U.S. 279, 307–12 (1991).
54. Id. at 307–08.
55. Id. at 309–10.
56. Id. at 307–10.
57. Id. at 308–09.
58. Id. at 291.
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the first place: those that could be “quantitatively assessed in the context of
other evidence,”59 those occurring “during the presentation of the case to the
jury,”60 and those that are simply errors “in the trial process itself.”61
Of course, Fulminante was not the Court’s last word on the subject. In
Sullivan v. Louisiana, Justice Scalia wrote for a unanimous Court that the
denial of the right to a jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt62 was
“unquestionably” a “structural error,” because that right reflects “a profound
judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice
administered,” and because the consequences of the deprivation of that right
“are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate.”63
The structural-error doctrine did not expand for some time, though the
Court did tease some developments. For example, in Johnson v. United
States, the Court asked for the first time – but ultimately did not answer – a
question that this Article later addresses: whether “structural error”
automatically satisfies the third “affect[s] substantial rights” prong of the fourpart plain-error test introduced in United States v. Olano.64 (The court avoided
the question, finding instead that the error identified did not satisfy the fourth
prong of the Olano test: it did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of the judicial proceedings.65 It would sidestep this question

59. David McCord, The “Trial”/”Structural” Error Dichotomy: Erroneous,
and Not Harmless, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1401, 1412 (1997) (quoting Fulminante,
499 U.S. at 307–08).
60. Id. at 1414 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307).
61. Id. at 1415–16 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310).
62. The trial court had issued a jury instruction that included a
constitutionally faulty definition of reasonable doubt, which Justice Scalia
explained could not be remedied by harmless-error review. As the court
explained, “[T]he Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt and the Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury verdict are interrelated. It
would not satisfy the Sixth Amendment to have a jury determine that the
defendant is probably guilty, and then leave it up to the judge to determine (as
Winship requires) whether he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words,
the jury verdict required by the Sixth Amendment is a jury verdict of guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Our per curiam opinion in Cage, which we accept as
controlling, held that an instruction of the sort given here does not produce such
a verdict.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993) (internal citations
omitted).
63. Id. at 281–82. Interestingly, Justice Rehnquist—the author of the
majority opinion in Fulminante—expressed in a concurring opinion concern over
Justice Scalia’s application of Fulminante in Sullivan. But “[d]espite these
lingering doubts,” he joined the majority. Id. at 284–85.
64. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468–69 (1997); United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993).
65. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469–70.
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twice more.66) Notably, Johnson did answer one question: whether structural
error can be forfeited. It implicitly concluded that it could.67
The next Supreme Court case to contribute to the structural-error
doctrine was Neder v. United States.68 Neder’s primary contribution was to
attempt to streamline the Court’s “categorical approach to structural errors.”69
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Rehnquist clarified that just because
an error might appear to be a functional equivalent to a known structural error,
that is not enough to justify treating that error as structural; an “error is either
structural or it is not.”70 According to the Court, a case-by-case approach is
incompatible with the trial-error/structural-error approach the Court had been
applying since Fulminante.71
But Justice Rehnquist said something else in Neder, too: he defined
structural errors as those that “are so intrinsically harmful as to require
automatic reversal, i.e., “affect substantial rights,” without regard to their
effect on the outcome.”72 This was a subtle reframing of structural error: recall
that, writing for the majority in Sullivan, Justice Scalia explained that a
characteristic of structural errors is that their effects on the outcome “are
necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate.”73 (The Court did not then
acknowledge the dichotomy it was creating within the doctrine, but it does so
later as we will see.74)
Until Weaver v. Massachusetts75 – discussed in the next Subpart – the
structural-error doctrine did not change much after Neder (though it is notable
which phrases the Supreme Court has ossified since then). The descriptions
of structural errors most common to the modern case law are that they “trigger
automatic reversal,”76 and are simply “not subject to harmless-error review.”77
(The first of these raises interesting questions about plain error and waiver
that I discuss later.) It will be interesting to see whether those remain the
“buzz phrases” after Weaver.
66. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 140–41 (2009); United States
v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 632–33 (2002).
67. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469–70. In Johnson, the Supreme Court determined
that the error in question had been forfeited, despite the lingering (and ultimately
unanswered) question whether the error was a structural error. Id. at 470. On this
basis, we can infer that structural errors can be forfeited; otherwise, the Supreme
court would have had to determine whether the error was structural before
concluding the error was forfeited.
68. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999).
69. Id. at 14.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
73. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1993).
74. Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1903 (2017).
75. Id. at 1904.
76. United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597, 611 (2013).
77. Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 252–53 (2008).
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C. Weaver v. Massachusetts
In 2017, writing for a six-justice majority, Justice Kennedy penned his
opinion in Weaver.78 In a lengthy section of dicta, he explained that in fact,
there is not one, not two, but “at least three broad rationales for finding an
error to be structural.”79 So much for Justice Rehnquist’s decade-long attempt
to preserve the simple binary of trial errors and structural errors!80
First, an error “is in some instances” structural “if the right at issue is not
designed to protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead
protects some other interest.”81 It is hard to say which phrase is less helpful:
“in some instances” or “protects some other interest.” Both are vague. Justice
Kennedy does give an example – a defendant’s right to conduct his own
defense – and this is somewhat clarifying.82 He notes that despite the fact that
exercising this right “usually increases the likelihood of a trial outcome
unfavorable to the defendant,”83 it is nonetheless “fundamental” that a
defendant be allowed to choose how to protect his own liberty.84
Second, an error might be deemed structural if its effects “are simply too
hard to measure.”85 Fair enough – this is the basis provided in Sullivan and
elsewhere.86 But Justice Kennedy did not stop there; he went on to say that
what justified deeming these errors structural was that “the efficiency costs of
letting the government try to make the [harmlessness] showing are
unjustified.”87 To put it plainly, this suggestion is totally novel to Weaver;
efficiency costs have never before appeared in the Supreme Court’s structuralerror jurisprudence. To the contrary, the idea of factoring in efficiency costs
when deciding that an error is structural or not appears to fly in the face of
Justice Rehnquist’s wholesale rejection of a functional-equivalency test –
recall that an “error is either structural or it is not.”88 In any event, I do not
anticipate that this supposed basis will take root and end up a part of the
Supreme Court’s future precedents – though whether any of the circuit courts
take the bait is an entirely different matter.
Finally, Justice Kennedy explained that an error might be deemed
structural “if the error always results in fundamental unfairness.”89 He

78. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1905.
79. Id. at 1903.
80. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–10 (1991); see also Neder
v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 14 (1999).
81. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908.
82. Id.
83. Id. (quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984)).
84. Id. (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975)).
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. at 281–82 (1993).
87. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908.
88. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 14 (1999).
89. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908.
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suggests that in these cases, it would be “futile for the government to try to
show harmlessness.”90
After describing these three bases, Justice Kennedy wraps up noting that
“[t]hese categories are not rigid” – he says that, in a given case, it is possible
for more than one of these rationales to apply.91 But it is worth asking, how?
Let’s recap these three bases for structural error: (1) error that is potentially
harmless to the outcome of a case but that protects some fundamental right;
(2) error for which the harm to the outcome is too difficult (or costly) to prove;
and (3) those errors where the harm to the outcome is certain.92 On their face,
these bases are non-overlapping: one begins where the next clearly ends.
Indeed, they seem to be devised precisely to cover discrete segments of a
spectrum.
Before Weaver, the bounds of structural error were relatively easy to
identify; the Court’s holdings were generally consistent with Justice
Rehnquist’s declaration in Neder that errors are not deemed structural on an
ad hoc basis – they are either structural or they are not.93 Yet Weaver’s “at
least three broad rationales”94 seem impossible to reconcile with Fulminante’s
and Neder’s strictly binary “trial error” vs. “structural error” approach95 – an
approach the Weaver Court does not so much as nod towards.
Another troubling aspect of Weaver is that, where Fulminante and its
progeny offered some guidance about how to decide whether an error is
structural, Weaver tells us that there are (at least) three bases upon which the
Court has, in the past, decided that an error is structural.96 Yet not only do
these bases expansively diverge from the Court’s trial-error/structural-error
rationale, they also provide no mechanism for deciding whether an error in a
future case is structural. Put differently, taken at face value Weaver reads
almost like a call to return to the post-Chapman, pre-Fulminante mode of ad
hoc decision-making.
But the most problematic aspect of Weaver is its holding that it is
possible for an error to be structural and yet not entitle the defendant to a new
trial.97 Justice Kennedy asserts that a structural error can be “subject to
exceptions.”98 Recall that the law, so far, has been clear: structural error
“trigger[s] automatic reversal.”99 The Weaver Court admits this is true when
the structural error was objected to at trial and raised on appeal100 – but things

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Neder, 527 U.S. at 14.
Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908.
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 280 (1991); Neder, 527 U.S. at 14.
Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908.
Id. at 1911.
Id. at 1910.
United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597, 611 (2013).
Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1910.
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get murkier when a structural error is instead raised “in the context of an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.”101 Yet instead of analyzing the
ineffective-assistance claim through the lens of Strickland v. Washington102
only, as Justice Alito’s concurrence does,103 the majority attempts to merge
the structural-error doctrine with Strickland’s requirement that, to succeed on
an ineffective-assistance claim, a defendant needs to show “a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.”104 Specifically, the majority
concludes that it can reach the structural error counsel failed to object to, and
that the structural error does not automatically satisfy Strickland’s prejudice
prong.105
Both Justice Alito’s concurrence and Justice Breyer’s dissent are more
faithful to the structural-error doctrine than is the majority opinion.106 I am
convinced Justice Alito’s concurrence gets things exactly right: Justices Alito
and Gorsuch concluded that, because Strickland prejudice was not shown, it
did not matter that there may have been a not-objected-to structural error.107
By contrast, Justices Breyer and Kagan conclude – also reasonably, if less
convincingly – that counsel’s failure to object to a structural error satisfied the
Strickland prejudice standard and required reversal.108 They reasoned that:
(1) structural errors always require a new trial; (2) counsel failed to raise a
structural error; (3) but for counsel’s failure to raise the error, the defendant
would have received a new trial; (4) therefore, the error was prejudicial.109
What Justice Alito’s concurrence and Justice Breyer’s dissent have in
common is that neither commits the doctrine-altering mistake of suggesting
that not all structural errors require automatic reversal.110

D. In Weaver’s Wake
After reading Weaver (and the discussion above), one might reasonably
think that the structural-error doctrine has departed drastically from its
Fulminante roots. But much of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Weaver

101. Id.
102. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
103. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1914 (Alito, J., concurring).
104. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
105. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1913.
106. See id. at 1914 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1917–18 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
107. Id. at 1914–16 (Alito, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 1917–18 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 1916–18. As I explain in the section on waiver, this line of reasoning
is flawed.
110. Id. at 1914–16 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1916–18 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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describing structural errors in general is descriptive dicta,111 and this, coupled
with the recent changes in the composition of the Court, leads one to believe
that the structural-error doctrine remains almost entirely intact post-Weaver.
To be more specific, the Court will likely limit its holding in Weaver to its
application of the structural-error doctrine to ineffective-assistance claims
under Strickland, and the “three-categories” approach will not obtain. The
Court will probably rely on the pre-Weaver line of cases moving forward and
turn to Weaver only when Strickland prejudice is at issue, or as a way of
describing what kinds of errors the Court has deemed structural. To see why
this is likely, it is worth taking a closer look at the current Justices’ views on
structural error, as revealed by Weaver and other cases. This Subpart argues
that Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kagan, Breyer, Thomas, and probably Chief
Justice Roberts, are unlikely to read Weaver as changing the doctrine.

1. Justices Alito and Gorsuch
Neither Justice Alito nor Justice Gorsuch are likely to read Justice
Kennedy’s “three bases” discussion as anything more than dicta. Justice
Alito’s concurrence in Weaver reveals a clear commitment to the Court’s
earlier precedent: citing Neder and Fulminante, he stated that structural error
only “comes into play when it is established that an error occurred at the trial
level and it must be decided whether the error was harmless.”112 Pointing out
that the high standard for prejudice under Strickland is “entirely different”
from the mere possibility of prejudice looked for under harmless-error review,
he concludes that it is irrelevant that the deprivation of the right to a public
trial is a structural error. 113 As for Justice Alito’s view on whether structural
errors sometimes do not require automatic reversal, he would disagree: as he
wrote in his dissent in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, “In Fulminante, we
used these terms [“trial error” and “structural defect”] to denote two poles of
constitutional error that had appeared in prior cases; trial errors always lead to
harmless-error review, while structural defects always lead to automatic
reversal.”114 From these opinions, it seems clear Justice Alito is not interested
in augmenting – let alone expanding – Fulminante’s narrow conception of
structural error.
As for Justice Gorsuch, he has said little about structural error, either
now or when he sat as a circuit judge. Yet his decision to join Justice Alito’s
Weaver concurrence,115 coupled with his hesitance to take up a related
111. See id. at 1905–14 (majority opinion).
112. Id. at 1915 (Alito, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 1915–16.
114. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 159 (2006) (emphasis
added).
115. See Weaver, 137 U.S. at 1914 (Alito, J., concurring). Admittedly, in
Weaver Justice Gorsuch also joins the majority opinion and Justice Thomas’s
concurrence, so perhaps we should not make much of this. See id. at 1904–05
(majority opinion); id. at 1914 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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structural-error question a year after Weaver (in which he and Justice Thomas
joined a dissent by Justice Alito),116 suggests that he, too, is unlikely to be
interested in augmenting or expanding the doctrine any time soon.

2. Justices Kagan and Breyer
Justice Breyer’s dissent offers the strongest rejection of Justice
Kennedy’s augmentation of the structural-error doctrine.117 Breyer speaks on
the issue clearly enough that his dissent warrants a block quote:
In its harmless-error cases, this Court has “divided constitutional errors
into two classes”: trial errors and structural errors. Trial errors are
discrete mistakes that “occu[r] during the presentation of the case to
the jury.” Structural errors, on the other hand, “affec[t] the framework
within which the trial proceeds.”
Our precedent […] simply views all structural errors as “intrinsically
harmful” and holds that any structural error warrants “automatic
reversal” on direct appeal “without regard to [its] effect on the
outcome” of a trial.
The majority here does not take this approach. It assumes that some
structural errors—those that “lead to fundamental unfairness”—but
not others, can warrant relief without a showing of actual prejudice
under Strickland. While I agree that a showing of fundamental
unfairness is sufficient to satisfy Strickland, I would not try to draw
this distinction.118

Put simply, Justices Breyer and Kagan appear to straightforwardly
defend not only the categorical approach taken by the Court since Fulminante,
but also its bright-line rule that, when timely raised, structural errors always
warrant automatic reversal.

3. Chief Justice Roberts
Unlike Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Alito (who all wrote or joined
concurrences functionally disagreeing with Justice Kennedy’s reasoning),
Chief Justice Roberts joined the majority opinion without qualification.119
Accordingly, it would be easy to argue that the Chief Justice by unequivocally
joining the majority in Weaver, approves of revising the doctrine.

116.
117.
118.
119.

McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1512 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting).
Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1916 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1904–05.
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On the other hand, Chief Justice Roberts has cultivated a reputation for
actively seeking the narrowest grounds on which to decide cases.120 That fact
alone suggests that, despite his having joined the majority in Weaver, he is
likely to treat Justice Kennedy’s “three bases” as descriptive dicta, rather than
prescriptive law – especially because the three bases do not present a
mechanism for identifying structural error ex ante.121 Moreover, a few years
earlier the Chief Justice joined Justice Alito’s concurrence in Gonzalez-Lopez,
in which Justice Alito had stressed that “structural defects always lead to
automatic reversal.”122

4. Justice Thomas
There is no reason to believe that Justice Thomas has changed his views
on structural error since Sullivan v. Louisiana and Neder v. United States –
two cases that rigorously applied Fulminante’s categorical approach to
structural errors.123 (Recall that in Neder, the court held that a “functional
equivalence” test “would be inconsistent with our traditional categorical
approach to structural errors.”124) Moreover, Justice Thomas wrote a
concurrence in Weaver, in which he stressed that he “d[id] not read the opinion
of the Court to preclude the approach set forth in Justice Alito’s opinion,
which correctly applies our precedents.”125

120. John Roberts, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the U. S., Address at the
Georgetown Law Center Commencement Ceremony (May 21, 2006) (“If it is not
necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, then in my view it is necessary not
to decide more.”); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, A narrow view of the law, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 6, 2007, https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2007-02-060702060147-story.html [https://perma.cc/43AC-Y43H].
121. By expressing that “[t]here appear to be at least three broad rationales”
for finding an error to be structural, Justice Kennedy provided descriptions of
three “buckets” into which we could place past structural errors—but his
categories to not provide a mechanism for deciding whether an as-yetunconsidered error is structural. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908. Consider the
vagueness of his assertion that “an error has been deemed structural in some
instances if the right at issue is not designed to protect the defendant from
erroneous conviction but instead protects some other interest.” Id. Explaining that
the Court has done something “in some instances” is purely descriptive; it does
not offer any insight into what grounds are sufficient to make an error structural.
See id.
122. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 159 (2006).
123. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993); Neder v. United States,
527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999).
124. Neder, 527 U.S. at 14.
125. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1914 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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5. Justice Kavanaugh
Justice Kavanaugh is arguably a wildcard: not only has he not heard a
structural error case before the Supreme Court, but he also said little about
structural error during his long tenure on the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit. The most he says about structural error
comes from one of the last opinions he authored while sitting on that court,
but it reveals little about his views of the doctrine overall.126 There is little in
Justice Kavanaugh’s record that would permit any prediction about how he is
likely to rule in future structural-error cases, though of there is also little
reason to believe he is likely to analyze such issues in the same way Justice
Kennedy did. Only time will tell.

6. Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg
Justice Sotomayor joined Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion without
reservation127 – suggesting that she is open to a revision of the doctrine. It is
worth pointing out that, while sitting as judge on the Second Circuit, Justice
Sotomayor authored a dissent in United States v. Yakobowicz in which she
stressed the automatic-reversal aspect of structural error: Structural errors are
those that “so fundamentally undermine the fairness or the validity of the trial
that they require voiding [the] result [of the trial] regardless of identifiable
prejudice.”128 Still, her joining of the majority in Weaver as a Supreme Court
justice should not be dismissed on the basis of this decade-old dissent as a
circuit judge.

7. Justice Barrett
Justice Barrett has been a member of the judiciary for just a few years,
and has only been a justice for a handful of months as of the publication of
this Article. She has not yet had an opportunity to rule in a structural-error
case, nor did she write on the subject before joining the court.
But we do have one datapoint: Justice Barrett clerked for Justice Scalia
from 1998–1999, at which time the court issued its ruling in Nader.129 As
noted above, the Neder court ruled that a “functional equivalence” test “would
be inconsistent with our traditional categorical approach to structural errors.”
We should not assume that Justice Barrett was in lockstep with the Justice for
whom she clerked, but Justice Barrett herself has publicly noted Justice
126. See Laccetti v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 885 F.3d 724, 728
(D.C. Cir. 2018) (declining to decide whether the deprivation of the right to
counsel during a PCAOB investigation was a structural error).
127. See Weaver, 137 S. C.t 1904–1905.
128. United States v. Yakobowicz, 427 F.3d 144, 155 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting
United States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 2000)).
129. Neder, 527 U.S. at 14.
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Scalia’s influence on her own jurisprudence, noting at one point that “His
judicial philosophy is mine too: A judge must apply the law as written.”130

III. IDENTIFYING STRUCTURAL ERROR: HOLDINGS OF THE SUPREME
AND CIRCUIT COURTS
What, then, is the state of the doctrine today – which constitutional errors
are structural? The following Subparts answer that question. Subpart A
begins by providing the reader with a functional definition a structural error.
Subpart B describes in detail the nine constitutional errors that the Supreme
Court has explicitly held are structural. And Subpart C discusses the many
other structural errors identified by the circuit courts.

A. A Working Definition of Structural Error
One goal of this Article is to distill the Supreme Court’s structural-error
holdings into a functional and accurate framework that is both descriptive and
prescriptive – a framework that can be used to correctly identify, and reject,
new structural errors. In the course of the writing of this Article, it became
apparent that nailing down an accurate but concise definition was critically
important. Through a review of nearly nine hundred circuit-court opinions,
the author uncovered over a dozen ostensibly “structural” errors that the
circuit courts have identified but that the Supreme Court has yet to weigh in
on.131 And while the Supreme Court’s list of structural errors is both
conservative and cohesive, the “structural” errors identified by the circuit
courts are anything but – exposing the need for a clearer and more accurate
prescriptive definition of structural error. Compounding this problem is the
Court’s discussion of the doctrine in Weaver which, as this Article already
argued, is both hopelessly vague and unhelpfully non-prescriptive.132
This Article proposes eschewing Weaver’s “three-categories” dicta and
instead adopting the following functional definition of structural error:
Structural error is constitutional error that so alters the foundational
constitutional framework of a case that the process itself has become defective
and is no longer constitutionally adequate. In addition to being consistent
with the Supreme Court’s past holdings describing and defining structural
error,133 this definition is simpler and more accurate than the “threecategories” approach and is more practical insofar as it is prescriptive, rather
than merely descriptive.
130. Marcia Coyle, Sept. 26, 2020, ‘His Judicial Philosophy Is Mine’: Amy
Barrett Touts Scalia in Remarks From Rose Garden, Law.Com
(https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2020/09/26/his-judicial-philosophyis-mine-amy-barrett-touts-scalia-in-remarks-from-rosegarden/?slreturn=20210016151916).
131. See infra Section III-C.
132. See discussion supra note 121.
133. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999).
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There are two additional reasons why this definition is more useful than
the Supreme Court’s past formulations. First, instead of describing harm that
is difficult or impossible to measure, this definition stresses that the error
unacceptably alters the constitutional framework itself. It is precisely because
the constitutional framework has been altered that the harm is difficult or
impossible to measure: the constitutional framework of the case is the
measuring scale that courts use to weigh harm. If the scale is broken, it cannot
accurately weigh anything; if the constitutional framework of a case is altered,
the court cannot look to the “rest” of the proceedings to fairly determine harm.
Second, structural errors affect some foundational aspect of that
framework. This is subtle but important: structural error damages something
preliminary that should be present from the beginning to the end of a case. If
the error does not damage a foundational part of the constitutional framework,
then it is likely a trial error – an error inflicting a forward-looking harm that
leaves the foundation of the proceedings intact (even though the harm to the
outcome might still be utterly devastating to one of the parties). This is not to
say that structural errors can only occur at the beginning of a case. Structural
errors certainly can occur later in the proceedings, but their effect is on the
foundation of the proceedings. Structural errors damage the constitutional
framework itself, and (to recycle the analogy), the scale being broken, harm
can no longer be accurately measured. This renders the proceedings
constitutionally inadequate.

B. Structural Errors Identified by the Supreme Court
Since the introduction of the structural-error doctrine in 1991,134 the
Supreme Court has been judicious in deeming constitutional errors
structural.135 Still, the list has expanded, and our highest court has identified
a total of nine distinct structural errors.136

1. The First Five Structural Errors
In Fulminante, Justice Rehnquist introduced the trial-error/structuralerror dichotomy for the first time, and in doing so identified a total of five
structural errors, reaching back through almost seventy years of past Supreme
Court holdings.137 These include (1) the total deprivation of counsel in a

134. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–10 (1991).
135. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468–69 (1997) (explaining that
the Supreme Court “ha[s] found structural errors only in a very limited class of
cases.”).
136. See infra Section III.B.1–5.
137. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309–10. He began with Tumey v. Ohio, a 1927
case. Id. at 309 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

19

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 6

984

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

criminal case,138 (2) having an impartial judge,139 (3) the unlawful exclusion
of members of the defendant’s race from a grand jury,140 (4) denial of the right
to self-representation at trial,141 and (5) the right to a public trial.142
The Court’s rationale for deeming these errors structural was
straightforward, if a little vague. Unlike “trial errors,” which “occur[] during
the presentation of the case to the jury and which may therefore be
quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to
determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,”143
these five errors “are structural defects in the constitution of the trial
mechanism, which defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards.”144 In other
words, “[t]he entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end is obviously
affected” by these errors.145
It is worth reflecting on these two statements for a moment because,
taken together, they illuminate one of the inherent difficulties the Court has
had in applying the structural-error doctrine. To say that structural errors
“defy analysis by harmless-error standards”146 is to suggest that it is not
possible to consider whether a structural error was harmless. Fair enough –
but that does not seem to fit with the Court’s same-paragraph assertion that
the “entire conduct of the trial” is “obviously affected.”147 If it is “obviously
affected,” does that mean that the harm was obvious? In fact, Justice
Rehnquist did not mean that at all, as is clear after reading Fulminante in
broader context. He meant not that the outcome to the defendant was
“obviously affected,” but rather that the structure was obviously affected. Put
another way, Justice Rehnquist was saying that determining the harmlessness
of the error would be impossible because the error contaminated the very
mechanism for measuring harmlessness; the structure of the trial itself.
Quoting Justice Powell’s majority opinion in Rose v. Clark, Justice Rehnquist
clarified that “[w]ithout these basic protections, a criminal trial cannot reliably
serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no
criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.”148
Justice Rehnquist’s explanation for why measuring harm would be
impossible comports with the functional definition proposed in Subpart IIIA.
Each of the five errors Justice Rehnquist identified damages the preliminary

138. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963)).
139. Id. (citing Tumey, 273 U.S. at 535).
140. Id. at 310 (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986)).
141. Id. (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177–78 n. 8 (1984)).
142. Id. (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n. 9 (1984)).
143. Id. at 30–08.
144. Id. at 309.
145. Id. at 309–10.
146. Id. at 309.
147. Id. at 309–10.
148. Id. at 310 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577–78 (1986)).
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constitutional framework of the case, such that the proceedings on the whole
no longer offer a way to fairly measure the harm to the outcome. The
proceedings themselves are no longer constitutionally adequate, so a new trial
– with a new, intact constitutional framework – is necessary.

2. Constitutionally Deficient Reasonable-Doubt Instructions
A few years later in United States v. Sullivan, the Court identified a sixth
structural error – one that is a bit more nuanced than the five discussed in
Fulminante.149 In Sullivan, the trial judge had given a constitutionally
deficient reasonable-doubt jury instruction that amounted to allowing
conviction even where the jurors’ doubts went beyond “no reasonable
doubt.”150 Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, explained that
because of the instruction, Sullivan was not actually convicted “beyond a
reasonable doubt,” as the Sixth Amendment requires. Furthermore, harmlesserror analysis made no sense in this context, because to ask whether the jury
instruction was “harmless” would be to ask whether the jury would have
convicted Sullivan had the jury been given the proper instruction. This,
Justice Scalia explained, would not do: a defendant has a constitutional right
to actually be convicted beyond a reasonable doubt, so it would not satisfy
that right to say that the jury would have convicted him if properly
instructed.151
If you find this reasoning troubling, you are in good company.152 What
makes Justice Scalia’s reasoning so confounding is that it seems like it could
apply to all constitutional errors. After all, one might understand him to be
saying that harmless error should never apply when a person’s constitutional
rights are violated, because they have a right not to have those rights actually
violated and applying harmless-error review does not un-violate those rights.
In fact, Justice Scalia is pointing out something particular to the Sixth
Amendment right to conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Harmless error
cannot apply to this right because the power to convict or acquit rests solely
in the hands (and minds) of the jury.153 It is of no consequence that, looking
at the evidence, a judge might be certain that a reasonable jury would find a
149. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993).
150. Id. at 280–81.
151. Id. at 281 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986)) (“[T]he
essential connection to a ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ factual finding cannot be
made where the instructional error consists of a misdescription of the burden of
proof, which vitiates all the jury’s findings. A reviewing court can only engage in
pure speculation—its view of what a reasonable jury would have done. And when
it does that, “the wrong entity judge[s] the defendant guilty.”).
152. Shortly after Sullivan was published, one scholar asserted that “Sullivan
is a telling blow to the validity of the Fulminante dichotomy,” and said that
Sullivan invites the question of “just how committed to it most of the members of
the Fulminante majority are.” McCord, supra note 59, at 1425–28.
153. See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281.
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defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Even in such a case, a judge is
not allowed to bypass the jury and find a defendant guilty; again, the jury has
the sole power to convict.154 It follows, then, that harmless error cannot apply
when a jury convicts someone based on the wrong legal standard. In such a
case there is no actual jury conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, and to
accept the conviction anyway on harmlessness grounds would be the same as
bypassing the jury allowing the judge to enter a judgment of guilty.
Viewed through our proposed functional definition, this error is an
example of structural error that, despite occurring very late in the proceedings,
inflicts foundational damage. The entire constitutional framework of a
criminal case is designed to require the government to prove to a jury the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To allow conviction under any
other standard completely alters the constitutional framework of the case; the
trial’s very purpose has been subverted. Moreover, only the jury can convict
or acquit, and the error has permanently damaged that jury. The concept of
harmlessness is therefore inapposite, and a new trial must be had.

3. Denial of One’s Counsel of Choice
The Supreme Court did not identify another structural error until thirteen
years later when, in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, the Court concluded that
the denial of one’s counsel of choice was a structural error. Once again
writing for the Court (but this time only for a majority), Justice Scalia
explained that the Sixth Amendment “commands, not that a trial be fair, but
that a particular guarantee of fairness be provided—to wit, that the accused be
defended by the counsel he believes to be best.”155 As such, because
harmless-error analysis speaks only to the fairness of the trial, it should not
apply.156
It is noteworthy that Justice Rehnquist and three other members of the
Court were unpersuaded by this reasoning. Writing for the dissent, Justice
Alito opined that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to the assistance
of counsel.157 Accordingly, Justice Alito said that a better holding would be
to say that the “erroneous disqualification of counsel does not violate the Sixth
Amendment unless the ruling diminishes the quality of assistance that the
defendant would have otherwise received.”158 This is an interesting take on
the harmless-error doctrine: rather than simply concluding that an erroneous
disqualification is susceptible to harmless-error analysis – which would look
to whether the disqualification might have harmed the defendant – the dissent
would have held that reversal is warranted when the quality of the lawyer is
154. See id. at 277.
155. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 140 (2006).
156. See id. at 140–41.
157. Id. at 153 (Alito, J., dissenting). He also pointed out that the extent to
which that guarantee grants a defendant the right to assistance is greatly
circumscribed. Id. at 152–153 (Alito, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 155 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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perceptibly different. It is an interesting exercise to imagine the difficult
position this rule would have put the courts of appeals in: what measuring rods
might they have used in trying to decide who the higher quality lawyer was?
Just like the denial of the right to represent oneself, the denial of one’s
counsel of choice is an unusual constitutional protection because its
enforcement can actually cause harm to a defendant. Just as eschewing
appointed counsel and opting to represent oneself is usually a strategically
poor decision, a defendant’s chosen counsel may be inferior to other counsel
the defendant has access to.159 Denying a defendant’s right to choose his own
lawyer – just like denying one’s right to self-representation – alters the
preliminary constitutional framework of the case. A defendant’s decision
about representation is a decision about how she wishes to respond to the
government’s attempt to convince a jury of her guilt. Courts hold a defendant
responsible for the words and actions of counsel160 – and that is
constitutionally permissible only if the defendant is represented by counsel of
his own choosing. Accordingly, allowing the case to proceed in the face of
an erroneous denial of one’s right to choose their own counsel would
unacceptably alter the foundational constitutional framework of the case.161

4. Magistrate Judge Presiding Over Jury Selection Without Consent
In Gomez v. United States, decided in 1989 before the introduction of
the structural-error doctrine in Fulminante, the Supreme Court explained that
one of a defendant’s basic rights is “to have all critical stages of a criminal
trial conducted by a person with jurisdiction to preside.”162 The Court
concluded that harmless-error analysis does not apply in a felony case in
which, over the defendant’s objections, the district court permits some other
person to oversee jury selection.163 Nearly twenty years later in Gonzalez v.
United States, the Supreme Court relied on Gomez to rule that it is structural

159. See, e.g., supra Section IV-C (discussing a hypothetical in the section
entitled “Structural Error and Waiver”).
160. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 113–14 n.13 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
161. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S at 146 (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984)) (“‘The Constitution guarantees a fair
trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a fair
trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment, including the
Counsel Clause.’ In sum, the right at stake here is the right to counsel of choice,
not the right to a fair trial; and that right was violated because the deprivation of
counsel was erroneous. No additional showing of prejudice is required to make
the violation ‘complete.’” (internal quotations omitted)); see also supra Section
III-A (providing this article’s functional definition of structural error).
162. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 876 (1989).
163. Id.
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error for a magistrate judge to preside over jury selection without the consent
of the parties.164
As for applying the functional definition, this structural error is easy: no
matter how qualified and distinguished a magistrate judge is, that judge cannot
preside over the critical stages of a trial without the consent of the parties.165
Jurisdictional defects are about as “foundational” as errors get, and they
certainly alter the constitutional framework of the case (for if jurisdiction is
lacking, there can be no case at all).

5. Allowing Counsel to Admit Guilt Over Defendant-Client’s
Objections
In its most recent structural-error decision, McCoy v. Louisiana, the
Supreme Court held that it is structural error for an attorney to admit a
defendant-client’s guilt over that client’s objections.166 Writing for the
majority, Justice Ginsberg explained that “[s]uch an admission blocks the
defendant’s right to make the fundamental choices about his own defense.”167
Notably, Justice Ginsberg suggested this case fit into what Justice Kennedy
described as the first rationale for structural error:168 that this error is not
designed to prevent unfairness to the outcome; it is designed “protects some
other interest.”169 According to Justice Ginsberg, “The effects of the
admission would be immeasurable, because a jury would almost certainly be
swayed by a lawyer’s concession of his client’s guilt.170

164. Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 252 (2008).
165. Id.
166. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1505 (2018).
167. Id. at 1511.
168. Id.; id. at 1508 (quoting Weaver v Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1908
(2017)) (“Just as a defendant may steadfastly refuse to plead guilty in the face of
overwhelming evidence against her, or reject the assistance of legal counsel
despite the defendant’s own inexperience and lack of professional qualifications,
so may she insist on maintaining her innocence at the guilt phase of a capital trial.
These are not strategic choices about how best to achieve a client’s objectives;
they are choices about what the client’s objectives in fact are. ([S]elfrepresentation will often increase the likelihood of an unfavorable outcome but
‘is based on the fundamental legal principle that a defendant must be allowed to
make his own choices about the proper way to protect his own liberty’).” (internal
citations omitted)).
169. Weaver v Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (2017).
170. McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1511. A word on McCoy: as the dissent points out,
the majority in McCoy arguably oversimplified the case, and arguably reached a
question that the parties did not raise. Id. at 1512, 1517 (Alito, J., dissenting). But
though the dissent’s arguments have considerable merit, the majority’s opinion is
the law, and it held that allowing criminal-defense counsel to admit guilt over a
client’s objections is structural error. Id. at 1505, 1512. Despite how the majority
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Given the way Justice Ginsberg described the error in McCoy, one could
argue that this actually looks like an especially harmful trial error. After all,
Justice Ginsberg told us that “a jury would almost certainly be swayed” by the
lawyer’s improper concession.171 And what could be more harmful to one’s
defense than having your own lawyer turn against you before the jury (as the
McCoy majority characterizes defense counsel as having done)? The majority
appears to conclude that because such an action is always harmful, it is
therefore structural.172 But this rationale is deficient. Plenty of errors that the
Court has characterized as trial errors definitely cause harm. Consider, for
example, that the introduction into evidence of a coerced confession is only a
trial error, despite its obviously prejudicial nature.173
The better rationale would be to place McCoy error in the same group as
Sullivan or Gonzalez error.174 As discussed supra, among the foundational
trappings of a constitutionally-adequate criminal trial is that the government
carries the burden of convincing the jury to convict the defendant beyond a
reasonable doubt. Defense counsel that goes against his client’s express
wishes and admits guilt on her behalf provides no defense at all. In the
extremely unlikely event that this occurs, the defendant’s constitutional right
to put on a defense – a foundational piece of any constitutional criminal trial175
– is destroyed.

C. Structural Error in the Circuit Courts
Departing from the Supreme Court’s short list of confirmed structural
errors, this Article turns now to what structural errors the circuit courts have
identified that the Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on. All published
circuit-court opinions that include the phrase “structural error” – nearly 900
cases – were reviewed. Excluding the rulings overturned by the Supreme
Court, at least fifteen errors that the circuit courts have concluded are
structural but that the Supreme Court has not yet considered were identified.
In some instances, the Supreme Court would likely agree that the error
identified is structural – but in others – most, in fact – the circuit courts’
analyses fall short and would likely be overturned were the Court to review
them. This Subpart discusses each of these errors, the reasoning employed by
reached the question, this article nonetheless engages with the court’s holding and
analysis.
171. Id. at 1511.
172. See id.
173. See Glebe v. Frost, 574 U.S. 21, 25 (2014) (citing Arizona v. Fulminante,
499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991)).
174. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280–81 (1993) (explaining that
faulty reasonable-doubt instructions are structural error); Gonzalez v. United
States, 553 U.S. 242, 253 (2008) (holding that a magistrate judge presiding over
jury selection without the consent of the parties or their attorneys is structural
error).
175. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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the circuits that identified them, and the likely outcome of Supreme Court
review.

1. Structural Errors the Supreme Court is Likely to Affirm
a. Presence of a Biased Juror
Let’s start with an easy one: at least two circuits have concluded that the
presence of a biased juror constitutes structural error.176 In United States v.
French, the First Circuit concluded that the presence of a biased juror is
exactly the kind of error that “deprive[s] defendants of ‘basic protections’
without which ‘a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle
for determination of guilt or innocence.’”177 The presence of a biased juror,
just like the presence of a biased judge,178 alters the fundamental framework
of the trial and contaminates the entire course of the proceedings; it is
therefore structural. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has already said that the
unlawful exclusion of a juror of the defendant’s race is structural error,179 and
the root of that error is the potential bias it introduces into the jury pool.180
b. The Nonconsensual Absence of the Judge While the Trial Is Proceeding
It is also structural error for a trial judge to be totally absent during a
critical stage of a trial, as the Third Circuit held in United States v.
Mortimer.181 As they put things,
[a] trial consists of a contest between litigants before a judge. When
the judge is absent at a ‘critical stage’ the forum is destroyed. . . There
is no trial. The structure has been removed. There is no way of

176. See United States v. French, 904 F.3d 111, 119 (1st Cir. 2018), cert.
denied sub nom. Russell v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 949 (2019); Dyer v. Calderon,
151 F.3d 970, 973 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998).
177. French, 904 F.3d at 119 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8–
9 (1999)).
178. Dyer, 151 F.3d at 973 n.2 .
179. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 294 (1991) (citing Vasquez v.
Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263–64 (1986)).
180. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017) (“The same
cannot be said about racial bias, a familiar and recurring evil that, if left
unaddressed, would risk systemic injury to the administration of justice. This
Court’s decisions demonstrate that racial bias implicates unique historical,
constitutional, and institutional concerns. An effort to address the most grave and
serious statements of racial bias is not an effort to perfect the jury but to ensure
that our legal system remains capable of coming ever closer to the promise of
equal treatment under the law that is so central to a functioning democracy.”).
181. United States v. Mortimer, 161 F.3d 240, 241 (3d Cir. 1998).
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repairing it. The framework ‘within which the trial proceeds’ has been
eliminated.182

This is an excellent framing of why this is indeed a structural error; the
total absence of an adjudicator during a critical part of the trial totally alters
the fundamental framework in which the trial proceeds. Certainly, a judge
does not have to be in the room all of the time: she could halt the proceedings
and leave the room for a moment to take a phone call, for example, or possibly
even conduct the trial via video conference (subject to the local rules, of
course). But to allow the trial to move forward in her absence would be little
different than letting her law clerk preside instead of her183 – or, as was the
case in Gonzalez v. United States, allowing a not-consented-to magistrate
judge to do so.184
c. Invalid Jury Waiver During Guilty Plea
The Ninth Circuit has held that an invalid jury waiver is structural
error,185 and though the court did not provide much in the way of support for
this ruling, it is nonetheless almost certainly correct. The Supreme Court in
Sullivan stressed that depriving a defendant of the right to be convicted by a
jury of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt constituted structural error.186 The
Court explained that the power to convicted rested in the jury alone, and
allowing the court to enter a judgment of guilty despite having lowered the
bar below “reasonable doubt” amounted to an unconstitutional directed
verdict.187 A simpler version of that same reasoning can be applied to cases
of invalid jury waivers: if the waiver was invalid, then the defendant was
deprived of his right to be convicted by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
d. Cronic Error
In United States v. Cronic, a pre-Fulminante (meaning pre-structural
error) case, the Supreme Court concluded that there were three situations in
which a defendant’s right to the effective assistance of counsel is so totally
violated that no showing of prejudice is required in order for a defendant to
receive a new trial.188 The first of these is “the complete denial of counsel” –
a constitutional violation that, just a few years later, the Supreme Court
182. Id. at 241 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309–10).
183. One Illinois state court judge was accused of doing exactly that a few
years back. See Jacob Gershman, Illinois Judge Accused of Letting Clerk Dress
in Judicial Robe and Hear Cases, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, August 8, 2016,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-LB-54345 [https://perma.cc/96H2-K9WZ].
184. See Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 253 (2008).
185. United States v. Shorty, 741 F.3d 961, 969 (9th Cir. 2013).
186. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1993).
187. See id. at 280.
188. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658–60 (1984).
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confirmed was structural error.189 The second such situation occurs when
“counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful
adversarial testing[.]”190 The third (and presumably rarest) situation arises
when, “although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the
likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide
effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate
without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial.”191
The Fourth Circuit has concluded that these second two situations – the
second and third Cronic errors – are structural errors just like the first (total
deprivation of counsel).192 Given the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Cronic
and Fulminante, the Fourth Circuit is probably correct. In Cronic, Justice
Stevens explained that “[u]nless the accused receives the effective assistance
of counsel, ‘a serious risk of injustice infects the trial itself.’”193 Put
differently, Justice Stevens explained that all three of these errors result in
“constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want
of prejudice would cure it.”194
Though Cronic is a 1984 case, it seems clear that the Supreme Court
conveyed that Cronic errors alter the constitutional framework of the trial so
much that there is no way to repair the damage (what else could
“constitutional error of the first magnitude” mean, after all?). Add to this the
fact that the Supreme Court has already ruled – albeit without referencing this
case – that the first Cronic error is indeed structural error, and there is every
reason to believe the Supreme Court would agree that the other two Cronic
errors are structural as well.

189. Id. at 659 (“Most obvious, of course, is the complete denial of counsel.”).
190. Id. (“Similarly, if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case
to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth
Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively
unreliable.”).
191. Id. at 659–60. Such a scenario would be vanishingly rare. To offer one
possible example, such a situation might be present if a trial court were to insist
upon so speedy a trial that even a competent counsel could not adequately prepare
a defense in the time allotted.
192. United States v. Ragin, 820 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Cronic errors
are structural, requiring automatic reversal without any inquiry into the existence
of actual prejudice.”).
193. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343
(1980)).
194. Id. at 659.
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2. Structural Errors the Supreme Court is Unlikely to Affirm
a. Appointments-Clause Violations
In Landry v. F.D.I.C., the D.C. Circuit held that violations of the
Appointments Clause195 are structural errors.196 To support this conclusion,
it reached for two Supreme Court cases: Freytag v. C.I.R. and Neder v. United
States.
Freytag, written just months after Fulminante, described
Appointments-Clause errors as belonging in “the category of
nonjurisdictional structural constitutional objections that could be considered
on appeal whether or not they were ruled upon below.”197 Notably, Freytag
did not reference or discuss Fulminante structural error – and, when viewed
in its fuller context, by “structural” Freytag plainly meant “relating to the
structure of the constitution,” not “structural error” as described in
Fulminante.
Nevertheless, with Freytag in hand, the D.C. Circuit then read Neder to
say that the label “structural” always applies to Fulminante structural error.198
It concluded without additional support that because Appointments-Clause
matters relate to the structure of the constitution, such errors “seem most fit
for the [structural-error] doctrine [because] it will often be difficult or
impossible for someone subject to a wrongly designed scheme to show that
the design—the structure—played a causal role in his loss.”199
This reasoning has nothing at all to do with Fulminante structural-error
doctrine. Fulminante did not comment on the structure of the Constitution;
instead, it explained that structural error is concerned with constitutional
violations that take place during court proceedings. By contrast, Landry
involved a challenge to a violation of a procedural rule in a statute that
arguably related to the structure of that statute.200 The court also erroneously
suggested that Fulminante’s discussion of harmless-error review somehow
related to injury.201 It may well be true that Appointments-Clause violations
195. The Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution empowers
the president of the United States to nominate “ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the
United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for[.]” U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2.
196. Landry v. F.D.I.C., 204 F.3d 1125, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
197. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878–79 (1991).
198. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1131 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8
(1999)) (“The Court recently noted its use of the label ‘structural,’ observing that
only in a limited class of cases has it ‘found an error to be “structural,” and thus
subject to automatic reversal.’”).
199. Id.
200. See id. at 1330; 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (2000).
201. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1130-31 (“But the Court uses the term ‘structural’
for a set of errors for which no direct injury is necessary—such as a criminal
defendant’s indictment by a grand jury chosen in a racially or sexually
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de facto cause injury, but whether or not a party has been actually injured
sounds in constitutional standing doctrine and has nothing to do with any form
of error review.202
b. Allowing the Government to Summarize Testimony After Each Witness
Samuel Yakobowicz was charged with four counts of filing false federal
tax returns and one charge of trying to impede the administration of justice.
During his trial and at the conclusion of each witness’s testimony, the
prosecutor was permitted to summarize for the jury each witness’s
statements.203
The Second Circuit concluded that “[a]llowing argumentative interim
summations […] was a structural error requiring reversal.”204 As the court
explained:
The problem is not that any particular interim summation was unduly
prejudicial. The problem is that the repetitive and cumulative
summations altered and undermined the defense’s use of the
presumption of innocence as a defense and had indeterminable effects
on defense strategy and tactics. It is simply beyond the power of
harmless error analysis to determine the impact of a procedure that had
a repetitive and cumulative effect.205

No doubt the error here was a problem – but equally certain is that this
was trial error, not structural error. Dissenting from the majority opinion,
then-circuit-judge, now-Justice Sotomayor stressed that “structural error
encompasses defects in trial components that do not bear directly on the
presentation or omission of evidence and argument to the jury, but rather that
relate to the impartiality of the forum or the integrity of the trial structure writ
large.”206 Citing several Supreme Court cases, she went on to point out that
“[w]hile the repeated incidence of trial error does not transform it into
structural error, repetition may bear on whether the error was harmless or
prejudicial in a particular case.”207
Justice Sotomayor had the right of it, of course. These summations,
occurring during the course of the trial, were discrete errors that did not alter
the constitutional framework of the case itself. As such, the errors – taken
discriminatory manner.”) This, of course, is not “structural error” in the
Fulminante sense. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
202. F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Facts, and Private Rights, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 275, 289–90 (2008) (discussing injury as a conditional
requirement for standing).
203. United States v. Yakobowicz, 427 F.3d 144, 146 (2005).
204. Id. at 154.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 155.
207. Id. at 156.
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individually or together – can be reviewed for harm in the context of the rest
of the proceedings.
c. Conviction by a Jury of Less Than Twelve Jurors Without Party Consent
Near the start of Francisco Curbelo’s federal trial for several drug- and
firearm-related offenses, the district court excused one of the jurors after she
called in sick.208 Over Curbelo’s objection, the court ordered that the trial
proceed with only eleven jurors.209
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit concluded this was error and that, “[l]ike
other structural errors, the error here has repercussions that are ‘necessarily
unquantifiable and indeterminate.’”210 Invoking some of Justice Scalia’s
language in Sullivan, the Fourth Circuit went on to say that “[w]e simply
cannot know what [e]ffect a twelfth juror might have had on jury
deliberations[,]”, and attempting to determine that “would involve pure
speculation.”211
There is a certain logic to this reasoning. If we assume that the right to
be convicted by a twelve-member jury is a fundamental constitutional right,
then it would seem that virtually all of Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Sullivan
would apply here. Recall that Justice Scalia explained that a faulty
reasonable-doubt instruction was structural error, because its effect was that
the jury’s “conviction” was not a constitutionally sufficient conviction under
the Sixth Amendment, meaning there actually was no conviction at all. Put
differently, a fundamental part of the constitutional framework of any criminal
trial is that a jury must convict the defendant of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Extending that reasoning here, one might say that if the composition
of the jury is constitutionally deficient, then it follows that no SixthAmendment conviction has actually occurred.
But there is a serious flaw with this reasoning, as the dissent pointed out:
the Constitution does not require a jury of twelve.212 The majority tries to get
around this inconvenience by suggesting that it does not matter. “[W]hether
violative of the Constitution or not,” it said, “the error is structural.”213 But
declaring it does not make it so; structural errors, as the Supreme Court has
stressed since the beginning, are a special class of constitutional errors.
Accordingly, it is not structural error to be tried by a jury of fewer than twelve
jurors; the Fourth Circuit got it wrong. Ironically, there was no reason for the
208. United States v. Curbelo, 343 F.3d 273, 275 (4th Cir. 2003).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 281.
211. Id.
212. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970) (“We hold that the 12-man
panel is not a necessary ingredient of ‘trial by jury,’ and that respondent’s refusal
to impanel more than the six members provided for by Florida law did not violate
petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights as applied to the States through the
Fourteenth.”).
213. Curbelo, 343 F.3d at 280.
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court to try to squeeze the structural-error doctrine into this particular box: it
held in the alternative that the error was not harmless. The Fourth Circuit
should have left it at that.
d. Allowing Unplayed Tapes to Go Back to the Jury Room
As the reader might have noticed, one through-line connecting many of
the circuit courts’ erroneous structural-error rulings is that those courts
mistakenly treat structural errors as quantitatively different from trial errors,
rather than qualitatively different. Put another way, although the Supreme
Court has stressed that trial errors and structural errors are categorically
different,214 circuit courts sometimes deem an error structural on grounds that
the error is unusually harmful. That is not sound reasoning; the degree of
harm does not make an error structural. After all, plenty of trial errors are
utterly devastating to the defense; consider a conviction that rests on a false
confession, for example.215 It is the inherent nature of the error that
determines whether it is trial or structural error – not its grievousness.
The Ninth Circuit’s structural-error ruling in United States v. Noushfar
explicitly relies on this kind of erroneous reasoning.216 In Noushfar, several
defendants were charged with conspiracy to import rugs from Iran despite an
embargo on Iranian goods.217 The trial judge erroneously permitted the jury
to take fourteen audio recordings back to the jury room even though the tapes
had never been presented in open court.218
The Ninth Circuit concluded that allowing the tapes to go back was
structural error.219 It acknowledged that a similar error – allowing the jurors
to replay tapes that they had already listened to, but this time outside of the
presence of the defendant – was susceptible to harmless-error review.220 It
nonetheless concluded that the error here could not be reviewed for harm,
because “[a]llowing the jury to listen, without any guidance, to tapes that had
never been presented in open court is a more grievous error than replaying
them in a judge’s presence.”221
Grievous indeed – but also reviewable for harmlessness. Despite the
severity of the error, it does not alter the fundamental framework in which the
214. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 14 (1999) (“Under our cases, a
constitutional error is either structural or it is not. … such a [functional
equivalence] test would be inconsistent with our traditional categorical approach
to structural errors.”).
215. See, e.g., Glebe v. Frost, 574 U.S. 21, 25 (2014); Arizona v. Fulminante,
499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991).
216. United States v. Noushfar, 78 F.3d 1442, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996), amended
by 140 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1998).
217. Id. at 1444.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1445.
220. Id. 1444–45.
221. Id. at 1445.
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trial proceeds; rather, it is an especially harmful admission-of-evidence error.
The fact that the error undermined the fairness of the trial does not mean that
the error is de facto structural; rather, it means that the outcome of a reviewing
court’s harmless-error analysis is a foregone conclusion.
e. Failure to Appoint an Independent Psychiatrist to Assist the Defense
In Ake v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court held that when an indigent
defendant demonstrates that his sanity at the time of the offense will be a
significant factor at trial, the state must provide a competent psychiatrist to
provide examination, as well as to assist in the evaluation, preparation, and
presentation of the defense.222
In Hicks v. Head, a post-Ake habeas-corpus case, the Eleventh Circuit
had ruled that Ake error was trial error subject to harmless-error review.223
Yet despite binding itself in that earlier case, in McWilliams v. Commissioner,
the court concluded that Ake error was structural when raised on direct
appeal.224 The court insisted that the holdings of the two cases were
consistent: it explained that the Ake violation was trial error when raised on
collateral review, but when reviewed on direct appeal, that error is
structural.225 The court reasoned that in the earlier habeas case, the petitioner
was able to present the expert opinions of the psychiatrist as evidence, which
could be evaluated to determine whether the Ake violation was harmless.226
By contrast, in McWilliams there was no psychiatric expert opinion to review,
and without that evidence, the court could not review the Ake error for
harmlessness.227
This reasoning is flawed for several reasons. First, it relies on the false
premise that if a serious error can be reviewed for harmlessness in one context
but not in another, then it is trial error in the first context and structural error
in the second. But an “error is either structural or it is not.”228 The difference
between trial error and structural error is categorical and qualitative; the nature
of an error does not change based on the context in which it is raised on
review.229 Second, courts are not asked to decide whether an error is harmless
in a vacuum; the parties have the burden of proving harmlessness to the
court.230
222. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
223. Hicks v. Head, 333 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003).
224. McWilliams v. Comm’r, Alabama Dep’t of Corr., 940 F.3d 1218, 1224
(11th Cir. 2019).
225. Id. at 1225-26 (“Our decision in [Hicks] does not compel a different
result.”).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1226.
228. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 14 (1999).
229. See id.; Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–10 (1991).
230. Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1349 (2016) (Alito,
J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)).
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When the defendant has made a timely objection to an error, the
Government generally bears the burden of showing that the error was
harmless[.] By contrast, when a defendant has failed to make a timely
objection, “[i]t is the defendant rather than the Government who bears
the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.”231

Accordingly, just because the Government lacked evidence to show
harmlessness here, that does not mean the would-be trial error becomes de
facto structural – it simply means the Government was unable to meet its
burden.232 That this lack of evidence resulted from the district court’s
erroneous decision is of no moment; so much the worse for the government,
so much the better for McWilliams.
Third and more fundamentally, the Ake error is an evidentiary error. As
the Supreme Court explained in Ake, the reason for requiring access to a
competent psychiatrist is that “a defense may be devastated by the absence of
a psychiatric examination and testimony.”233 By committing Ake error and
not giving a defendant access to a psychiatrist’s examination and testimony,
the court functionally rejected the admission of material, admissible
evidence.234 As this Article has already discussed, admission-of-evidence
errors that happen during the course of the trial proceedings do not “affect[t]
the framework within which the trial proceeds.”235
f. Exposure of the Potential Jury Pool During Voir Dire to Prejudicial
Statements
During jury selection in William Mach’s trial for sexual conduct with a
minor, the judge questioned one potential juror, Ms. Bodkin, who happened
to have some expertise in subject matter relevant to the case (she had taken
several psychology courses, and had worked with children in the capacity of
state social worker for years).236 During the judge’s questioning, and in the
presence of the other potential jurors, the judge asked her several questions,
during the course of which Bodkin said that she had never seen a case where
a child’s statements had not been proved true, and that she had never known
a child to lie about sexual abuse.237
Using the same faulty reasoning that we have now seen several times –
presuming that the degree of grievousness is what makes an error structural –
the Ninth Circuit concluded that constituting a jury after they were exposed to
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
234. See McWilliams v. Comm’r, Alabana Dep’t of Corr., 940 F.3d 1218,
1226 (11th Cir. 2019).
235. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991).
236. Mach v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 630, 631–32 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended
(Nov. 20, 1997), as amended (Feb. 11, 1998).
237. Id.
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prejudicial statements “rises to the level of structural error.”238 Yet ironically,
the court based this conclusion on its finding that the error, in this particular
context, had in fact biased the jury: “Given the nature of Bodkin’s statements,
the certainty with which they were delivered, the years of experience that led
to them, and the number of times that they were repeated, we presume that at
least one juror was tainted . . . [and] [t]his bias violated Mach’s right to an
impartial jury.”239 This is ironic, because it makes crystal clear that it is not
Bodkin’s statements that violated Mach’s constitutional rights, but rather the
jury’s bias. The Ninth Circuit concluded that Bodkin’s statements amounted
to structural error precisely because they were harmful.240
But there is a simpler, more obvious reason why the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning (and ruling) is invalid. Not only is it not even a constitutional error
for a juror to express bias during voir dire, it is no error at all. After all, one
of the primary functions of voir dire is to expose juror bias so as to ensure that
a biased juror is not impaneled.241 Bodkin exposed her bias, and accordingly
she was kept off the jury; voir dire served its purpose.242
That is not to say that no error occurred. There is no question that
Bodkin’s statements had the potential to bias the jury pool; all prejudicial
statements have that potential, to varying degrees. As such, it would be error
not to ensure that the potential jurors exposed to Bodkin’s statements were not
prejudiced. In fact, that might even rise to the level of a constitutional dueprocess violation: if there is a constitutional right to an unbiased jury, then the
jury selection process must be adequate to safeguard that right – so if a pool
of potential jurors is obviously exposed to prejudicial statements, a
constitutionally adequate process probably requires the judge to discern the
effects of those statements. But that error – failure to question jurors about
their potential for bias after exposure to prejudicial statements – is not the
error identified by the Ninth Circuit.
g. Precluding Argument on the Defense Theory and Instructing the Jury That
No Evidence Supports That Theory
In several cases, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that it is structural error
for a trial court to improperly restrict counsel from making an argument
(because, for example, the district court mistakenly thinks that there is no
238. Id. at 633.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 633–34 (“Because the error in this case consisted of an unequivocal
and highly prejudicial statement made before a jury was sworn and because the
statement does not resemble the erroneous introduction of evidence that can be
weighed against other evidence, we are reluctant to describe the error as ‘trial
error.’”).
241. See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873 (1989) (“Jury selection is
the primary means by which a court may enforce a defendant’s right to be tried
by a jury free from ethnic, racial, or political prejudice . . .”).
242. Mach, 137 F.3d at 632.
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evidentiary basis for that argument).243 Though this error might well be highly
consequential, it does not have an effect on the constitutional framework of
the case. This is ultimately an evidentiary error in disguise: the “mistake” is
preventing counsel from pursuing a line of argument. That is no error at all,
so long as the district court is correct that there is no evidence in the record
that could support that argument. On the other hand, if the district court
erroneously believed that there was no evidence in the record supporting a
theory, then precluding the argument was improper. The correct way of
handling this error would be to review the judge’s finding of “no evidence”
for clear error; if there was indeed an error, then the government would have
the burden of showing that the error was harmless. Perhaps she would be able
to; perhaps not.
Notably, in one of the Ninth Circuit’s cases ruling that argument
preclusion is structural error, the court went on to conclude that the error was
harmful244 – so it is hard to argue that the error here “defies analysis by
harmless-error standards.”245
h. Failure to Include at Least One Teacher on an Individualized Education
Team in Accordance with the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act
As should be apparent by now, the Ninth Circuit has not applied the
structural-error doctrine as rigorously as Supreme Court precedent suggests it
should have; of all of the errors the circuit courts have erroneously concluded
were structural, this one should strike the reader as the most unlikely (except,
perhaps, for the D.C. Circuit’s confused Appointments Clause decisions246).
In M.L. v. Federal Way School District, a school district violated a
procedural requirement of the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act
that required every child’s Individualized Education Team247 to include at
least one regular education teacher among its members.248 The school district
failed to include such a member in plaintiff’s team, and the Ninth Circuit
concluded that this was a “structural defect in the constitution of the IEP
team.”249
The Ninth Circuit then erroneously concluded that this was Fulminante
structural error. Just because the statutory violation committed by the school
district violated the “structure” of the Act does not mean that there was a
structural error anywhere in the course of the trial.250 There is little more to
243. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 859 F.3d 730, 737 (9th Cir. 2017).
244. See, e.g., United States v. Miguel, 338 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“However, even if we were to conclude that harmless error analysis applies, as
the Government suggests, we would still reverse.”).
245. Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 67 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
246. See, e.g., Landry v. F.D.I.C., 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
247. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2000).
248. M.L. v. Fed. Way Sch. Dist., 394 F.3d 634, 649 (9th Cir. 2005).
249. Id at 636.
250. See id. at 646.
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say about this; the supposed error here was actually just a statutory violation
that gave rise to a civil lawsuit.251 There was no constitutional error and
certainly no structural error.
i. Failure to Instruct a Jury Orally
In a 1992 case, People of Territory of Guam v. Marquez, the Ninth
Circuit ruled that a district court’s failure to orally instruct a jury on the law it
is supposed to apply is structural error.252 It reaffirmed this holding in a 2019
case, United States v. Becerra.253 In Marquez, the court reasoned that
appellants are entitled to a “record of sufficient completeness” in order to
allow them to identify a prejudicial error.254 This is an overreading of
Supreme Court precedent, but even if it were the law, the Marquez court
misapplied it. The court said that even though the district court had issued
written instructions, those instructions were inadequate because there was no
way of proving that the jury actually read them.255 Accordingly, because there
was no way to know whether the jury read the instructions, there was no way
to know whether the failure to orally instruct was harmful – and therefore, the
error must be structural.256
In Becerra, the same situation occurred – except that this time, the
district court specifically ordered each juror to read the instructions, and then,
after, questioned each of them to confirm that they had.257 The Becerra court
nonetheless concluded that the district court committed structural error,
declaring that oral instructions are easier to comprehend, and that the oral
component has an air of “solemnity” important to the process.258
Judge Graber dissented from this view, and his opening paragraph is so
succinct that it is worth quoting in its entirety:
I respectfully dissent. The district court erred by failing to read all the
instructions to the jury aloud. But the error was clearly harmless in this
particular case. The court gave the jury written instructions—the final
versions of which Defendant concedes were entirely correct—and
orally instructed the jury to read those instructions. The jurors
confirmed—individually and in open court—that they had in fact read

251. Id. at 636, 649–50.
252. Guam v. Marquez, 963 F.2d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1992).
253. United States v. Becerra, 939 F.3d 995, 998 (9th Cir. 2019).
254. Marquez, 963 F.2d at 1315 (quoting Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S.
189, 194 (1971)).
255. Id. at 1315.
256. Id. at 1315–16.
257. Becerra, 939 F.3d at 998–99.
258. Id. at 1005.
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the written instructions, and the evidence of Defendant’s guilt was
overwhelming.259

He was right, of course. Leaving aside that oral jury instructions might
not even be constitutionally required – there appears to be no Supreme Court
caselaw holding that it is – it is certainly possible to determine whether this
error is harmless. Anyway, the Supreme Court has also never ruled that it is
error to assume that a juror reads what the judge tells her to read – in fact, the
Ninth Circuit has declared that to be an appropriate presumption.260 Nothing
about this error alters the preliminary constitutional framework of the trial; it,
too, is at most trial error – whether as it appeared in Marquez, or as it appeared
in Becerra.
j. Exclusion of a Defendant from Trial
The Ninth Circuit has concluded that a trial conducted in absentia – that
is, without the presence of the defendant – is a structural error. 261 This, too,
is likely incorrect. First and foremost, Fulminante itself explicitly points out
that the exclusion of a defendant from trial is trial error, not structural error: it
listed this error as among those constitutional violations to which harmlesserror review applied262 (alongside Confrontation-Clause violations, which it
also categorized as trial errors susceptible to harmless-error review263).
Because the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide an exclusive
list of when it is appropriate for a defendant to be absent from trial
proceedings,264 it is certainly true that trial in absentia is error if one of those
listings does not apply. Yet interestingly, despite Fulminante’s having listed
this error as a trial error (which, remember, is one category of constitutional
error), the Supreme Court has been explicit that it has not yet decided whether
such absences are constitutional errors at all. 265
Even if this is in fact a constitutional error – perhaps on due-process
grounds – it would not alter the constitutional framework of the trial except in
the absurd (and probably impossible) case of a defendant (1) asserting his
Faretta right to represent himself, and then (2) being forcibly prevented from
being present during the trial. In that scenario the structural error technically
woud not be the defendant’s absence per se; it would be the deprivation of the
defendant’s fundamental right to self-representation.

259. Id. at 1006 (Graber, J., dissenting).
260. United States v. Smith, 831 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 2016).
261. Hegler v. Borg, 50 F.3d 1472, 1476 (9th Cir. 1995).
262. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307 (1991).
263. Id.
264. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b).
265. See Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 262 (1993); see also Fairey v.
Tucker, 567 U.S. 924 (2012) (cert. denial memorandum).
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k. Brecht v. Abrahamson “footnote 9” Error
The Third Circuit has concluded that footnote 9 of the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Brecht v. Abrahamson describes a new structural error.266 In its
entirety that footnotes says,
Our holding does not foreclose the possibility that in an unusual case,
a deliberate and especially egregious error of the trial type, or one that
is combined with a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct, might so infect
the integrity of the proceeding as to warrant the grant of habeas relief,
even if it did not substantially influence the jury’s verdict. Cf. Greer v.
Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 769, 107 S. Ct. 3102, 3110, 97 L. Ed. 2d 618
(1987) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). We, of course, are not
presented with such a situation here.267

The Third Circuit misread this footnote. It does not describe a new class
of structural error. Instead, it explains that there might be a trial error that,
combined with a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct, warranted habeas relief
absent a showing of prejudice. It is true that the effect of an error’s being
structural is that it is not subject to harmless-error review – but that does not
mean that all errors not subject to harmless-review are structural. The
Supreme Court was careful in Brecht not to call this kind of error structural;268
that is a distinct category of error with distinct qualities. Here, the Court
simply points out that its ruling in Brecht does not decide whether it is possible
for some combination of trial errors to have the effect of rendering review for
prejudice unnecessary.269
This may seem like wordplay, but the distinction matters: the Third
Circuit’s interpretation commits a kind of logical fallacy by presuming that if
all structural errors are remediable without harmless-error review, then all
errors remediable without harmless-error review are structural errors. By
analogy, the Third Circuit suggests that, because it is true that all apples are
fruits, it must be true that all fruits are not apples. Not so, of course.
At any rate, the most charitable reading of the Brecht footnote for the
Third Circuit might be to say this: Brecht leaves open the possibility that some
trial errors, in combination, can be treated as though they are structural errors
for the purposes of prejudice review in habeas cases.

IV. UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS
The previous Part discussed the many errors identified by the Supreme
Court and circuit courts as structural; this Part takes a step back to consider
what implications there are in deeming an error structural. Specifically, this
266.
267.
268.
269.

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 n.9 (1993).
Id.
See id.
Id.
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Part considers how the structural-error doctrine interfaces with two other
common doctrines: plain-error doctrine and waiver doctrine. It concludes that
a structural error always satisfies the third prong of the plain-error doctrine
(but does not always satisfy the fourth), and that – perhaps surprisingly –
structural errors are indeed waivable (though the situations in which this could
occur are narrow).

A. Waiver or Forfeiture: What is the Difference, and Why Does It
Matter?
An argument – or, more specifically for our purposes, an appellate or
collateral attack argument asking a court to review an error – can be either
waived or forfeited.270 As the Supreme Court has explained:
The terms waiver and forfeiture—though often used interchangeably
by jurists and litigants—are not synonymous. “[F]orfeiture is the
failure to make the timely assertion of a right[;] waiver is the
‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’”271

This distinction matters because waiver completely precludes review of
a right intentionally relinquished, whereas forfeiture allows for the possibility
of review in cases where the failure to raise the error was unintentional.272
Plea agreements offer one clear example of waiver. It is common for a
plea agreement – in which a defendant agrees to plead guilty, usually in
exchange for some kind of favorable treatment by the government – to include
an appeal waiver.273 Such a waiver amounts to an intentional relinquishment
of a defendant’s right to appeal the judgment in his case after he has formally
pleaded guilty.274 If he thereafter attempts to appeal his guilty plea, the
reviewing court will reject that argument as waived.275
By contrast, forfeiture occurs when the relinquishment of a right was not
intentional.276 For example, if there is an error in a defendant’s Sentencing
Guidelines calculations that the defendant did not see and therefore did not
object to – perhaps because he was not given enough time to review the
270. See Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 17
(2017).
271. Id. at 17 n.1 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)).
272. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733–34 (1993).
273. See id. at 733.
274. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 908 F.3d 241, 247 (7th Cir. 2018)
(quoting United States v. Flores-Sandoval, 94 F.3d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1996)) (“By
stipulating to the conduct in the plea agreement’ and embracing that stipulation in
the presentence report, in his sentencing memorandum, and at his sentencing
hearing, Young has ‘waived any claim that he did not engage in that conduct.’”).
275. Id.
276. United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 447 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S.
Ct. 504 (2019).
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calculations – that error would be deemed forfeited.277 A forfeited argument,
unlike a waived one, is reviewable on appeal – but the standard of review is
narrow; the defendant would receive only plain error review on the forfeited
issue.278 We will start our discussion here, with the plain-error doctrine.

B. Structural Error and the Plain-Error Doctrine
This Article began by discussing the history and development of the
harmless-error doctrine and explained that in the early part of the twentieth
century, both the federal and state governments codified mandates ordering
appellate courts to disregard any errors that do not affect substantial rights.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) is the modern federal criminal
codification of this rule; it requires that “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or
variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”279 The
companion provision, 52(b), codifies the plain-error doctrine, explaining that
“[a] plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though
it was not brought to the court’s attention.”280
Though it took some time, the Supreme Court has settled on what is
required to satisfy the strictures of 52(b). A defendant must show four things:
(1) There must be an error or defect that the appellant has not
affirmatively waived; (2) it must be clear or obvious; (3) it must have
affected the appellant’s substantial rights, i.e., affected the outcome of
the district court proceedings; and (4) if the three other prongs are
satisfied, the court of appeals has the discretion to remedy the error if
it seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.281

The question this Article considers is whether a structural error always
satisfies the third and fourth prongs of this test.
In fact, the Supreme Court has implicitly answered the question whether
the fourth prong is automatically satisfied by a structural error (we’ll go back
and discuss the third prong later). In Johnson v. United States, the Supreme
Court dealt with an error subject to plain error review – an error the petitioner
asserted was structural.282 The Supreme Court agreed that the error satisfied
the first and second prongs of the plain-error test.283 But when the time came
to decide whether the error satisfied the third prong, the Court dodged two
277. See id. at 448 (noting that the court “address[es] each omission in light of
the surrounding circumstances to determine whether the defendant’s decision not
to object was knowing and intentional.”).
278. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733.
279. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
280. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
281. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).
282. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–68 (1997).
283. Id.
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issues at once: it explained that, because the error did not satisfy the fourth
prong of the plain-error test, it did not need to decide whether the third prong
was satisfied, nor decide whether the error was actually structural at all.284
That last part – that the Court declined to decide whether the error was
structural, yet also decided that the error did not satisfy the fourth prong285 –
is pregnant with the inference that even if the error had been structural, it still
would not have satisfied the fourth prong of the test. Framed another way, if
it were true that all structural errors automatically satisfy the fourth prong of
the plain-error test, then the Supreme Court would have had to decide whether
the error was structural before concluding that the fourth prong was not met.
Whether a structural error automatically satisfies the third prong of the
plain-error test remains an open question; as we just saw, the Supreme Court
has managed to avoid answering it so far.286 But despite the Supreme Court’s
silence on the question, four circuit courts – the Third, Fourth, Sixth, and
Ninth – have weighed in, and all agree that structural error automatically
satisfies the third prong of the test.
The Third Circuit pointed to the Supreme Court’s statements in Olano
that “there may be a special category of forfeited errors that can be corrected
regardless of their effect on the outcome”287 to conclude that “this category is
coextensive with the category of structural errors.”288 The Fourth Circuit
hinted at this reasoning in one of its first cases to address this issue289 but did
not actually answer the question until 2014 when, in cursory fashion, it
declared it had previously ruled that all structural errors satisfy the third
prong.290 (In fact it had never so-ruled: the case it cited for that proposition
held that a particular structural error – a faulty reasonable-doubt instruction
as in Sullivan – satisfied the third prong; it did not say that was true for all
structural errors.) The Sixth Circuit employed a too-strong version of the
same reasoning provided by the Third Circuit, suggesting that in Olano the
Supreme Court had already held that structural errors satisfy the third prong.
(As noted earlier, that is not correct; the Court has so far reserved that
question.291) Finally, the Ninth Circuit joined the Third and the Fourth, but
without offering much in the way of a clear explanation why.
Despite the deficiencies in some of these circuits’ reasoning, their
ultimate conclusion that structural errors automatically satisfy the third prong
of plain-error review is probably correct (although Weaver v. Massachusetts
complicates the question, as we will soon discuss). Recall that harmless-error
review and plain-error review have the same codified origins: Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52. That rule says, in full,
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id. at 469–70.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993).
United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 153 (3rd Cir. 2002).
United States v. David, 83 F.3d 638, 647 (4th Cir.1996).
United States v. Ramirez-Castillo, 748 F.3d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 2014).
See United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 526 (6th Cir. 2005).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss4/6

42

Henderson: A Comprehensive Consideration of the Structural-Error Doctrine

2020]

CONSIDERING THE STRUCTURAL-ERROR DOCTRINE

1007

(a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that
does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.
(b) Plain Error. A plain error that affects substantial rights may be
considered even though it was not brought to the court’s attention.292

Each provision includes the phrase “substantial rights,” and we are
certainly obligated to give the phrase the same meaning wherever it appears
in the same rule.293 But notice that according to the rule, harmless-error
review applies to errors that do not affect substantial rights, whereas plain
error review applies to errors that do affect substantial rights. This matters to
our third-prong inquiry because structural errors are not susceptible to
harmless-error review – meaning courts do not affirmatively decide whether
a structural error affected substantial rights. And if courts do not look into
whether substantial rights were affected, then it is not true – at least as a matter
of formal logic – that plain error review applies. Rule 52(b) says that if
substantial rights are affected, then the error may be considered. If we have
not confirmed that substantial rights were affected, then technically, the
sufficient condition of Rule 52(b) has not been satisfied.
This quandary is exacerbated by courts’ uncareful descriptions of
structural error. Consider the dicta in Weaver, for example: recall that Justice
Kennedy divided structural errors into three categories – one for which the
error protects some other interest and might not affect substantial rights;
another for which the effects of the error are too hard to measure; and a third
for which the error definitely affects substantial rights.294 If we were to apply
these three categories rigorously, then only the third would satisfy Rule
52(b)’s “affects substantial rights” category – meaning only it would satisfy
the third prong of plain-error review.
Recall, too, that historically, harmless-error review was introduced as
restrictive, not a permissive, rule.295 Before Rule 52 and its ancestry, courts
tended to review all errors;296 Rule 52(a) placed a restriction on what kinds of
errors courts were allowed to review (specifically, they were no longer
allowed to review harmless ones). Viewed through that historical and logical
lens, structural errors are errors for which that restriction does not apply. That
suggests, as a textual matter, that the third prong of plain-error review requires
more than a mere showing that 52(a) does not apply.
Ultimately, though, these concerns are too technical, given how the
doctrine has actually been applied by the Court. Despite Weaver’s confusing
categories, it seems clear that every time the Supreme Court has identified a
292. United States v. Yamashiro, 788 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2015).
293. See ANTONIN SCALIA AND BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS, 170 (2012).
294. Weaver v Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (2017).
295. See Act of Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. L. 1181; see also Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 758 (1946).
296. Traynor, supra note 3, at 3.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

43

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 6

1008

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

structural error, it has concluded that it so-alters the constitutional framework
of the trial that the fairness of the proceedings are destroyed – and it
undeniably is a substantial right of a defendant to have a fair trial. Whether
the ultimate outcome would be the same is certainly one kind of prejudice, but
structural errors focus on more fundamental substantial rights than mere
outcome determinacy. The Court will likely conclude on this basis that all
structural errors satisfy the third prong.
In sum, it is likely the Supreme Court will rule that structural error
automatically satisfies the third prong, and this Article argues that it has
already ruled that a structural error does not automatically satisfy the fourth
prong.

C. Structural Error and Waiver
The last question this Article addresses is whether structural error can
ever be waived. The Supreme Court has not yet answered this question,
though several circuits have weighed in. Before going to the circuits, it is
worth pausing to think through the logic of why structural error should, or
should not, be susceptible to waiver.
We know already that a structural error can be forfeited – so why
couldn’t one be waived? There is no technical or legal reason why structural
errors cannot be waived, but there is a line of thinking that might lead us to
conclude that they are not waivable in practice. Though that reasoning is
incorrect, it is worth our time to walk through it.
Whatever else is true of structural error, one thing is certain: raising an
objected-to structural error on direct appeal results in automatic reversal.297
Put slightly differently, if properly objected to, a party is guaranteed to have
the error remedied. Add to this what must be true of all waiver: it is the
(The unintentional
intentional relinquishment of a known right.298
relinquishment of a known or unknown right is forfeited, as we discussed
earlier.299) So to waive a structural error, one must intentionally relinquish
the right to raise it. But let’s expand this out a bit: waiving a structural error
means intentionally giving up the right to raise an error that will guarantee
you a new trial. On its face, it might seem like an absurd decision – one that,
in practice, no party or counsel would ever make. As a result, one might argue
that any accusation (by the government, for example) that a party waived a
structural error must fail, because no party would ever intentionally give up
the right to raise such an error.

297. United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597, 611 (2013) (quoting United States
v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2010)) (“We have characterized as ‘structural’
‘a very limited class of errors’ that trigger automatic reversal because they
undermine the fairness of a criminal proceeding as a whole.”).
298. Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 13
(2017).
299. Id.
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Though convincing on its face, this reasoning relies on the false premise
that there are no good reasons to waive a structural error. That is simply
untrue. Imagine that you are a criminal defendant with plenty of money in the
bank – enough money to hire whoever you want to defend you. You have a
lawyer as a family friend, and you really trust him: he always says smartsounding things when he comes over for dinner, and he brags constantly about
all the cases that he has won. After you are indicted, you try to retain him –
but for some erroneous reason, the judge prevents him from representing you.
(Let’s stipulate that it was structural error to prevent you from hiring this
attorney; he is in good standing and has defended criminal cases before in this
court, but the judge just thinks he is obnoxious.)
When your newly court-appointed public defender stops by your jail cell,
you are obviously upset. You tell her, “I don’t even want you to represent me,
you know – the court wouldn’t let me use my lawyer, and he’s the only one I
want. Now I’m stuck with you.” To your surprise, she tells you that it sounds
like what the judge did was wrong, and that so long as there really is no good
reason why your friend cannot practice before the court, you have a right to
be represented by him. She then explains that the court committed what is
called a structural error. She goes on to explain that, so long as you object to
the denial and the court denies your objection, you can appeal, and the
reviewing court will be forced to reverse the case no matter the result.
You are obviously relieved; what a great attorney, you think! You and
she plan to raise that objection at the next hearing. In the meanwhile, you
decide to look up some of your friend’s cases to see for yourself how he
handles his cases. You are horrified. His written work product is full of
incomplete sentences and is impossible to read. Worse, you discover that
despite all his bragging, in fact he has not won a single criminal case. In a
panic, you look up your public defender and, to your great relief, discover that
she has won multiple awards for outstanding advocacy. You are even more
shocked and impressed to learn that she has the highest acquittal rate of any
attorney in the city.
Needless to say, you tell her not to raise the objection. She represents
you through trial and sentencing and does an amazing job, but you still ended
up losing your case; a jury convicts you, and you are sentenced to twelve
months’ imprisonment. Remembering what your attorney told you about
structural error (and recalling that she said something about automatic
reversal), you decide to appeal. On appeal you invoke your right to selfrepresentation and explain in your brief that you know all about structural
error, that the district court committed one, and that you know that you have
the right to a new trial.
What result? The answer is obvious: by not objecting, you waived your
structural-error argument. In fact, you had an excellent strategic reason not to
object: you got lucky, and your court-appointed attorney was far superior to
the attorney the court erroneously prevented you from hiring. Sure, if you had
objected you could have gotten a new trial with your counsel of choice – but
the structural error you experienced ended up being a windfall; it would have
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been foolish to object to it. There is no justification for giving you a second
bite at the apple in this case, and waiver is appropriate.
And sure enough, this is the reasoning the circuit courts that have heard
the issue have applied. In United States v. Christi, the First Circuit explained
that “[i]t is of no matter to this waiver analysis that a violation of the Sixth
Amendment public trial right is structural, as distinct from merely trial
error.”300 The Eleventh Circuit agrees: “Structural defects do not absolve a
defendant’s waiver of a defense or objection.”301 And the Seventh Circuit
explained that because “[d]octrines of default and waiver are grounded in
federalism and comity,” structural errors can indeed be waived – even when
raised in a habeas petition.302

V. CONCLUSION
The modern structural-error doctrine represents one of the most
interesting conclusions we have drawn in a centuries-long debate about how
perfect court proceedings should be. In one sense, the doctrine represents a
return to a nineteenth century way of thinking about error: the doctrine could
be seen as a recognition of the concern, common to early-twentieth-century
judges, that the effects of an error might not be predictable or visible, and so
caution requires reversal. Structural errors underscore the complexity of the
legal system and the impossibility of deeming some errors harmless or
harmful – especially when those errors connect to so many other moving
pieces that, because of the contaminating nature of the, can no longer be
reliably weighed. Put differently, structural-error doctrine acknowledges that
while most errors can be placed on a balance beam alongside the rest of a trial
and weighed, other errors damage the balance beam itself.
As often happens with categorical rules, what seemed simple at first has
threatened to become hopelessly complex with the passage of time. In less
than thirty years we have gone from Fulminante’s narrow binary to Weaver’s
multiple, vaguely descriptive categories. We have gone from just five
structural errors in the Supreme Court to nearly thirty when we add the
Supreme Court’s errors and the circuit courts’ errors together. And we still
have not confirmed key questions about how structural error interfaces with
waiver, forfeiture, and plain error.
This Article attempts to canvass what we know about structural error,
not just from Supreme Court precedent but also by reviewing nearly 900
published opinions of the circuit courts. It concludes that in fact most of the
“new” structural errors identified by the circuit courts are not structural errors
at all, and thus calls for those circuits to revisit their rationales, and for the
Supreme Court to issue a ruling to explain with more specificity and clarity
what direction the doctrine should be pointed in.

300. United States v. Christi, 682 F.3d 138, 142 (1st Cir. 2012).
301. United States v. Suescun, 237 F.3d 1284, 1288 (11th Cir. 2001).
302. Jackson v. Bartow, 930 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2019).
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Two final points. First, it is worth asking whether the structural-error
doctrine would have been simpler to understand and to apply if the Supreme
Court had retained Justice Rehnquist’s label of them as structural defects,
rather than errors. “Defect” connotes inherent brokenness, whereas “error”
connotes mistake. Perhaps the entire Fulminante line of cases could have
been simplified by more rigorously maintaining a distinction between errors
and defects, rather than between trial errors and structural errors.
Finally, the Article closes by acknowledging what ground it has not
covered – an area ripe for continued research by others interested in the
subject. This Article has not evaluated the many errors that the Supreme Court
and circuit courts have declared are not structural. This is a more substantial
task, to be sure – but one that, when combined with the errors addressed here,
might help to thicken the line between trial and structural errors, and in turn
provide an even more useful resource for academics and practitioners alike.
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